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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FLORA S. MECHAM, et al
Plaintiff and Ap·peUee,

vs.

Case No. 7865

ARTHUR R. ALLEN, J. H. ALLEN,
et al
Defendants and Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a jury verdict and an order of
the court denying Defendants Aliens' motion for a
directed vedict or a new trial. The action was brought
by Flora S. Mecham, the widow of T~omas Udell
:Mecham, for damages for the alleged wrongful death of
her husband and by Flora Mecham and her three minor
children for their personal injuries, the death and injuries
resulting from an automobile accident near Bridal Veil
Falls in Provo Canyon on July 4, 1950.
The Mechams had left their home in Wallsburg,
Wasatch County, early on the morning of July 4, and
had gone down to Provo to watch the Independence Day
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Fundingoccurred
for digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museum
and Libraryas
Services
Parade.
TheLawaccident
shortly
before
noon,
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they were on their way back up the canyon to their home.
Thomas Mecham was driving a 1941 Chevrolet coupe,
and Mrs. Mecham and the two younger children were in
the front seat, Linda lying on the seat between Mr. and
Mrs. Mecham and the baby, Gary, on her lap. The older
boy, Leonard, was in the back seat. The canyon was very
heavily traveled that day and cars going up the canyon
were proceeding in a steady stream.
The canyon road immediately below Bridal Veil
Falls is a straight-a-way which culminates in an "S"
curve to the right just at the base of the Falls. (Exhibit
"8" is a map and Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "2", "3",
"11", and "12" are photographs of the scene). The hard
surfaced portion of the highway is 21 feet wide with
gravel shoulders of varying widths. The highway was
divided into two lanes by a solid yellow line with broken
white lines on either side. Just as the Mecham car was
entering the curve, it was involved in a collision with a
1950 Ford Tractor and Trailer unit driven by Arthur R.
Allen, a son of J. H. Allen, two of the Defendants herein.
The truck, which was designed and used for hauling
cattle, had been purchasd new in May, 1950, by Mix
Johnson, the other Defendant. On June 7, 1950, Johnson
had agreed to sell the truck to J. H. Allen. Allen paid
Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) down with the agreement that the balance would be· paid when Allen sold his
wool in the fall, Johnson to retain title until the purchase
price was paid in full. Johnson had just acquired an
insurance policy on the vehicle and agreed to keep it
in force until the title was transferred. Relying on this,

2
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Allen had purchased no insurance on the truck, and
Johnson's insurer, upon discovering the facts, in June
1951, withdrew from the defense of the case and has
denied liability. The Aliens then employed their own
cotmsel.
On July 3. 1950, Arthur Allen, accompanied by his
cousin by marriage, Dale :Mousley, left the Allen farm
in Draper, Ftah, to take the truck to Wendover where,
in conjunction with Johnson and others, the Aliens were
hauling cattle for the Jordan Brothers to the summer
. range above Hewlitt's Ranch, approximately twenty (20)
miles East of Heber City, Utah. They picked up the
cattle and, alternating driving, proceeded to the ranch,
unloaded the cattle, and were on their way back empty
to the Allen farm when the accident occurred.
Other than the occupants of the vehicles involved,
no creditable witnesses to the accident were produced
at the trial. Thomas Mecham, the driver of the car, was
killed, and his widow, the Plaintiff, testified that she had
been looking out her side of the car and did not see the
truck until just before the crash. Arthur Allen was
confined to his bed at the time of the trial with rheumatic
fever, incurred since the accident, and testified only by
deposition, which had been taken by Plaintiff as a part
of the pre-trial discovery procedure. He testified that
while he was still in the bend, the Mecham car swerved
at him. He cut the truck off his side of the road and
"hit the brakes," leaving marks where he left the road.
The other occupant of the truck, Mousley, was present
in court and testified that he was not observing the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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highway particularly and his first sight of the Mecham
car was as Allen called "Look out" .and swerved the truck.
As a result of the impact, the left side of the Meeham
car was demolished. Mecham was killed and Mrs.
Mecham and the children received injuries. Mrs. Mecham
had her nose broken and scalp cut. At the time of the
trial, these had completely mended except f.or a slight
scar on her forehead which her doctor described as "very
faint," and s.he complained of headaches and backaches
when she overworked. The two older children's injuries
were slight, but the baby, Gary, was seriously injured.
The occupants of the truck were not seriously injured, but the force of the impact twisted the rear wheels
of the truck, broke its rear springs and the drive shaft,
and bent the frame of the trailer and sheared the springs
on its left rear, locking its wheels (Exhibit "5".) There
was no damage to the right side of the truck or trailer.
There was a slight, fresh dent in the rear of the left
front fender of the truck (Exhibit "13"), but the main
force of the impact was on the left rear of the truck and
left side of the trailer. Immediately after the collision,
the Mecham car was facing diagonally across the road,
its front end projecting into the lane for down canyon
traffic with considerable debris in front of it in the down
canyon lane (Exhibits "1" and "D".) The truck and
trailer were off the highway below the car with only
the left front wheel on the hard surfaced portion. The
investigating officers found gouges in the hard surface
extending from the debris in the down lane to the point
where the front end of the automobile came to rest.
4
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They al~o found tire burns about four ( -l-) feet North of
the center line in the down lane extending to the left
rear of the truck. The gouges are marked "G" on Exhibit
"S" and the burns "B''. To assist in visualizing the surroundings and accident, we have inserted herein a reproduction of the Inap (Ex. 8).
Counsel for Plaintiff did not cross examine any of
the investigating officers and presented as part of their
case in chief as to how the accident happened only
Flora Mecham, the Plaintiff, \Y. 0. Mecham, her fatherin-law, and Otis L. Ercanbrack, a neighbor from Wallsburg. On rebuttal, Plaintiff produced one Alfred M.
Carter, who Plaintiff claimed was not discovered until
the week end recess of the trial in January, 1952, although
he had worked all during the period in the same small
group with Plaintiff's father as a fellow emp1oyee of
rtah Construction Company at the Geneva Steel Plant.
Carter purported to have been fishing in Provo Canyon
the day of the accident and placed the locale of the accident considerably above the point fixed by all other
witnesses on both sides. Carter also testified the truck
was moved after the accident, although the undisputed
physical evidence was that it could not be moved without
the use of a wrecker.
The trial court dismissed the action against Johnson, dismissed Allen's cross complaint against him arising out of the failure to have insurance on the vehicle,
denied the Aliens' motion for directed verdict, and submitted the issues to the jury. The verdict of the jury
gave $30,000.00 for the death of Mecham, $7,500.00 for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the personal injuries to Gary Mecham, $5,000.00 for the
injuries to Flora Mecham, zero general damages for the
injuries to Linda and Leonard, and assessed special
damages in accordance with the prayer of the Complaint
as amended.
It is Defendants' position that the undisputed physical evidence fixed the collision in the Allen lane of
traffic, and on that ground, Arthur Allen could not have
been negligent, there being no testimony as to other
grounds of negligence which could have been a proximate
cause of the accident. Defendants further contend that
they were prejudiced by the court's instruction as to the
presumption of due care on the part of Thomas Udell
Mecham and that they should have had a new trial, if
not a directed verdict, because of the surprise testimony
of Carter and the availability of other evidence to discredit such testimony.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS ALLEN.
A. There is no creditable evidence that Arthur R.
Allen was negligent.

B. Thomas Udell Mecham was negligent as a
matter of law.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL
MECHAM.
6
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III.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.
A.
B.

Surprise, or the strange case of Mr. Carter.
N ezcly Discovered Evidence.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT FOR DEF'ENDANTS ALLEN.
A. There is no creditable evidence that Arthur R.
Allen was negligent.

It is Defendants' contention now and was at the
trial that the undisputed physical evidence in the case
established that the Mecham car was on the wrong side
of the road when the collision occurred and that, in conformity with the well established rule that oral testimony
to the contrary must yield to the undisputable physical
facts,
Haarstrich vs. 0. S. L., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac.

100;
Lavigne vs. Nelson, (N. H.) 18 At. 2d 832.
a finding should have been entered that Mecham was
negligent as a matter of law in being on the wrong side
of the road. Defendants further contend that there was
no creditable evidence to submit to the jury of negligence
on the part of Arthur Allen in the driving of his father's
truck.
No one at the trial was an actual eye witness able
to describe how the accident happened. Flora Mecham,
the Plaintiff, testified on direct examination as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"Q. Did you observe any automobiles coming
down the canyon just prior to the crash?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe the other vehicle involved
in the crash before the crash occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you describe in your words what you
observed?
A. Well, I was looking out on the road, rather
to the side, my side, and a car passed us and
then I turned and seen this big truck, just
swaying like that.
Q. Where was this big truck in relation to the
highway itself when you saw it~
A. Well, it just seemed like it was over on the
side of the road.
Q. And did you have an opportunity prior to
the crash to make any further observations?
A. No.
Q. Do you know in what lane of traffic your car
was immediately prior to the crash and the
time of the crash?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q. What lane were you in?
A. We was in our own lane.

Q. And in relation to the yellow line which
divides up canyon from down canyon travel,
where was this semi-trailer just immediately
prior to the crash and when the crash occurred?
A. Well, it seemd to me where I seen it, he was
over on our side of the road.
8
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Q.

Do you have any judgment as to how far over
on your side¥
A. Xo, I don't.'' (R. 269~270)
And on cross examination, Mrs. Mecham testified:

•'Q. Do you recall what part of the truck you saw
\Yhen you looked, turned and looked at it just
before the accident happened¥ I think that is
the way you testified. Do you recall what part
of the truck you saw at that time~
A. "Tell, that truck was coming and it seemed
to me like it was coming fast and was swaying so that I couldn't see the whole truck
itself, like it was standing still, but I could
see the bed of that truck sway.
Q. In other words, the thing that you saw at that
time was a bed and that was right up against
your automobile at that time, was it~
A. No.
Q. How far was the bed from you at that time,
Mrs. Mecham~
A. I don't know.
A. And before you made that observation you
had been looking out the side of the car as
you were going up the canyon~
A. Looking out my window on my side.
Q. And then you turned around and saw the bed
of the truck and the accident happened almost
simultaneously. Isn't that right~
A.

Yes." (R. 278.)

Taken together, her testimony was that she was
looking out her side of the car, just before the collision
she looked to the left, saw the bed of the trailer swaying,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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it "seemed like it was over on the side of the road", and
the accident happened almost simultaneously as she saw
the truck. Whether in reconstructing a flash observation
some year and one-half later, she gave the impression
she thought must have happened to place blame on a·
party to a collision in which her husband was killed and
she and her family injured, or whether a 45-foot truck
and trailer in negotiating the curve would seem to be
swaying to her side, we cannot tell, but certainly the flash
observation and the limited opportunity she had to observe is not substantial evidence upon· which the issue of
negligence on the part of Arthur Allen may be submitted
to a jury.
Seybould vs. Union Pacific, ______ Utah ______ 239,
Pac 2d 174.
The only other witness produced by Plaintiff who
purported to testify as to the events immediately preceding the collision was one Otis L. Ercanbrack who was
a neighbor of the Plaintiff and her famliy in Wailsburg,
Utah. Ercanbrack was also returning to his farm in
Wallsburg after the parade in Provo. He was driving an
F·3, 3t4 ton Ford truck (R 234), and was fourth in line up
the canyon behind the Mecham car (R 243). He could
see no better in the truck that he could in an ordinary
passenger car (R 235). When· he crossed the bridge just
below the scene of the accident (Exhibit 17), he was
going 35 miles per hour (R 236) and the cars were about
bumper to bumper or 3 feet apart going up the canyon
(R 247). Until the accident, he did not slow down (R 244).
He testified as to the how the accident happened as
follows:

10
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"Q. vVill you describe n1ore in detail, Mr. Ercanbrack, this truck that was coming down the
canyon'
A. 'VellQ. And that was involved in the accident, of
course'
A. As I remember it, there was an old Chev,
car or else a Ford, I don't know which it was,
a two- passenger car, coming ahead of the
truck and the truck came down and he was
evidently passing him.
~Ir.

Hansen: Well--·

A. And as he got down close to where the collision happened, the other old-the Chev. car
or Ford, whichever it was-they passed on
and he throwed his engine, and of course, he
kind of turned out on the other side of the
road. Then this here collision happened. That
car come up just as hard as it could come.
Well, it was the traffic, and it just happened
that quick." (R. 237 -238)
And as follows on page 239 of the Transcript:
"Well, the Mecham car. About that time I
thought I could get by it and I pulled out to the
right and I went right up to the side after he hit
and I pulled up to the side and I see I couldn't
get through. So he hit the car and went right up
under the back wheels. Right under the truck,
under this here trailer-truck, and then the drivers,
it seemed like they had, they backed up three
times and lossened the loose end quite a bit and
then· there was an old gray headed gentleman,
quite elderly man, he come up to me and asked me
if I would go out, if I would get out of the road;
I had pulled up too close, and I told him I would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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get out if I could and he says, 'We'll make room
for you' and they had at that time gotten the
truck off Tom's back and by that loosened the
truck up when he shoved it back, tried to back up.
They had gotten Tom's truck back; that was right
to the corner of the truck, so they could get Tom
out and they got him out and laid him down by
the cement road there and the car was a little bit,
was about like that shape and this old gentleman,
he got some other man and just shoved around
about two feet and then he let me go out and I
just missed the stump and went out on over here.
That is about all I, I left then and went on home."
And at page 246, on cross examination, he said:

"Q. Did you see the truck coming around the

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

curve in the canyon there, the curve where
the accident occurred~
Well, just up, about seventy five feet, or
something like that.
Well, was the truck coming around the curve
when you first saw it; before it collided with
the automobile~
When I first saw the truck he was going to
pass this old Chev car.
I know, but where was the truck then with
reference to the curve in the highways ahead
of you~
Abont seventy five feet up the road.
Around the curve~
Oh just ahead of us there. The curve came
around like that. The road was so bad you
couldn't have seen it much further; seventy
five or one hundred feet.
Is it your testilnony you could see the truck

12
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A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

passing this car seventy five feet up-canyon
fr01n the curve? Is that your testimony~
\Yell, where the accident took place. That is
my testimony. When he seen these cars in
front the the truck evidently, the way it
looked to me, pulled his truck across and
engine across the side of the road.
I thought you told us in your direct examina-tion he had completely passed this car~
K o, I didn't tell you anything of the kind. He
got his cab across, past over the line and that
is when the Mecham car hit him.
\Yell, do I understand you to say the tractor
part, or the cab part of the truck was over
on the right side of the road~
Yes.
Over the center line~
It just got over the center line and then
they hit.
And the trailer was still back over the center
line~

A. Yes sir."
And at page 248-249:
"Q. Let me stand right over here and then everybody can see everybody here. Now Mr. Ercanbrack, if the tractor, or the cab part, as you
de signa tea, of the truck was on the lane
of traffic for down, that is for westbound
traffic, and if the trailer of that unit was over
on the lane of traffic for up-canyon that would
require a very sharp turn on the part of that
. unit, would it not, to get the truck in that
position~

A.

Well, not the way that I looked at it because

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this here old Chev car moved out of his way
and he slowed up a little, he immediately
slowed up and started to turn out of the road
but he didn't get off quick enough and Tom
come along and hit,him.

Q.

Then your testimony is that the truck unit
was coming down the curve on the wrong side
of the road trying to pass this old car¥ Is
that what you saw¥

A.

Yes sir. That is my testimony. That is the
way I saw it."

Ercanbrack further testified that he could stop his
car within a foot when going 35 miles per hour (R. 245);
that the Mecham car and the Allen truck stopped right
at the point they came together (R 250); that the truck
backed off the Mecham car (R 239, 249); and that a
group of by-standers "as thick as flies" lifted up the
truck and trailer weighing 8% tons (Exhibit "16") and
pulled the Mecham car back from under it (R 241, 242,
251).
Of course, each of those latter statements is a
physical impossibility. Anyone knows that a car going
35 miles per hour cannot be stopped- in one foot. The
vehicle would travel approximately 51 feet during the
reaction time and substantially twice that far after the
brakes were applied.,. Nor would the car and truck
have stopped right at the point they came together. The
truck and trailer weigh 8% tons empty (Exhibit "16")
and were going 30 miles per hour (R 304) just before the
accident. The car weighed a little over llf2 tons (Exhibit "15") and was going 35 miles per hour at the time

14
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of the accident if it was at the head of the column in
which Ercanbrack was traveling at that speed~ Under
such conditions, the vehicles would not stop as they came
together. Either the truck would drag the car or the
car would be thrust back from a point of impact by the
additional weight of the truck. Nor could a group of
men lift a trailer, weighing at the rear end, 5,760 pounds
(Exhibit "16") and drag the Chevrolet out from under.
N" or could a truck with its drive shaft broken back up
under its own power (See Exhibits "5" and "6").
It is submitted that the other testimony of Ercanbrack is equally incredible and not capable of belief.
First, as to his ability to see. By his own testimony he
was traveling 35 miles per hour, fourth in a column of
cars approximately 3 feet behind the car in front of him.
How much would he see of events seventy-five feet up
thioroad when his attention at that speed and under those
crowded conditions necessarily would be on the vehicle
directly ahead~ And if he had been looking, how much
could he see~ Plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "B", and "C"
indicate clearly the limited visibility from the area in
which Ercanbrack must have been when the accident
occurred. They show that one could not see a vehicle any
farther up canyon that the vehicle shown in Exhibit "11"
which is in the same position as the vehicle in Exhibit
"C" (Compare the bushes at the right of the gate in each
picture). Nor could he have been any closer to the
scene than the point where the photograph (Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C" were taken. Ercanbrack testified
he did not apply his brakes until the accident. If the
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cars were as close together as he described, they would
have all telescoped when the Mecham car hit the truck.
There is no evidence any such thing happened. Ercanbrack would have travelled fifty feet from the time he
was aware of the collision until he applied his brakes
and another 100 feet to stop. In addition, there were
two cars between him and the Mecham car or a total
of 32 feet; so that he was over 180 feet from the curve
when the collision occurred. Similarly, the truck. was at
least another 44 feet above the point where the brake
marks first appeared, that being the distance traveled
at 30 miles per hour during the reaction time of Arthur
Allen. Both the brake marks observed by W. 0. Mecham
(R 128) and those observed by investigating officers
(R 323, Exhibit "8") were above the location of the
Mecham car. Therefore, Ercanbrack was at least 220
feet from the truck when the collision was imminent and
he could not have observed the truck attempting to pass
a black "Ford or Chev" as he testified, around the curve
where it must have been. Even Ercanbrack admitted that
you could not see over seventy-five or a hundred feet
from the curve (R 246). Exhibit "2" clearly shows how
limited is the visibility around the curve looking up
canyon.
Secondly, as to what he says he saw, Ercanbrack
testified that the truck attempted to pass a car traveling
down canyon ahead of it, observed the Mecham car,
atte~pted to pull over, got the front of the truck out of
way, leaving the trailer three-fourths over in the Mecham
lane, (R 240). But the first point of impact was the
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rear of the left front fender (Exhibit "13"). If the tractor was cutting back into its own lane, as Ercanbrack
claimed, leaving the trailer in the wrong lane, the
Mechan1 car could not haYe creased the fender in the
manner shown in Exhibit "13". The first impact would
have been to the rear of the cab, not on the front fender.
Nor would anyone be likely to drive in the manner
described by . Ercanbrack. All agree the canyon was
crowded with holiday traffic. Would anyone with the
slightest regard for his own safety attempt to pass a
car on a blind curve under such conditions of traffic?
Yet, that is the story neighbor Ercanbrack tells. It is
striking that Ercanbrack, who was the third car behind
Plaintiff, is the only purported eye-witness produced by
plaintiff. White, the occupant of car No. 4 admitted he
did not see anything but commotion (R 173). What happened to the occupants of cars No. 1 and 2? Plaintiff's
diligence produced the mysterious fisherman who had
been working all the time with Plaintiff's father, but
that diligence failed to produce any real eye-witness.
W. 0. Mecham, father of Thomas U. Mecham, the
deceased, also testified as to some tire marks (R 127)
which he placed on his drawing (Exhibit 17) on the turn
just over the center line, although only a few months
before he had testified on deposition that he had seen
no brake marks, tire marks or debris (R 141-42) and made
no attempt to correct that statement in his deposition
when he signed it (R 143). He also admitted (R 144)
that his testimony as to marks was based on his observation and discussion with his attorneys at the scene
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of the accident in the late fall of 1950.
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, Defendants
contend that the issue of the negligence of Arthur Allen
should not have been submitted to the jury. Mrs. Mecham had only a flash before the collision and could not
have observed how it happened or where the truck was.
Ercanbrack's testimony is so incredible as to be incapable
of belief, and W. 0. Mecham's testimony as to tire marks
was, by his o'Yn admission, discredited. As was stated
by this Court in

DaUey vs. Midwestern Dairy Products, 80 Ut.
331, 15 Pac 2d 309.
"Where the evidence relied upon by Plaintiff
to establish some 1naterial issue of this alleged
cause of action is apparently impossible of being
true in light of facts which are established beyond
controversy, then and in such case, it becomes the
duty of the Court to take the cause from the
jury and deny Plaintiff the relief prayed."

B. Thomas UdeU Mecham was negligent as a matter of law.
The testimony of the investigating officers of the
Utah Highway Patrol, Evans and Clark,.as to the physical facts they found, testimony not even attempted to
be attacked by the Plaintiff by cross examination or
otherwise leads but to one conclusion : The Mecham car
was on the wrong side of the road when the collision
occurred. Under such circumstances that is negligence
as a matter of law.
Sections 57-7-120, 57-7-121, and 57-7-171, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, as amended.
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Staton rs. Trcsteru Jlacaruui lllanllfadllrin.r~
ComJ)(Ul.lf, 52 Ftah -l-:2(), 17-l- Pac. 821.
Turrietta rs. 1r.lfcl1c, (N.l\lex) 212 Pac 2d 1041;
Jones rs. Cary. :219 Ind. :2()8, 37 NE 2d 944.

Evans, the officer in charge, placed the truck about
72 feet down the road, off the highway on the right-hand
side directly under a tree (Exhibit "8"), and the Mecham
car on the South side of the front extending into the
middle of the road (R 323 and Exhibit "8"). With respect
to tire burns, Evans testified as follows: (R 323)
"Q. And will you describe the position of the tire
burns with reference to the truck and the
hard surface as to where they were on the
highway¥
A. The tire burns started about four foot north
of the center line.
Q. Now in which lane of traffic would that be,
Officer~

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

That would be in the lane of traffic for the
automobiles moving down the Canyon.
That would be the lane of traffic ·for down
canyon traffic~
That's right.
And then where did they go, if anywhere~
They extended to a point ·to the rear of the
· truck that was off on the north side of the
road."

He stated with respect to debris and gouges as follows:
(R 323-24)
"Q. Now did you see any other marks upon the
highway in the vicinity of the point where
those tiremarks began~ That is, where they
began up canyon from the truck~
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A.

Yes, There were some, a lot of debris there.
There was some gouges in the oil surface and
the gouges extended to the point where the
automobile came to rest."

Both these tire marks and gouges are shown drawn
by Officer Evans extending to the truck and the car
respectively (Exhibit "8", R 330). Evans further described the damage to the truck and trailer as follows:
"Q. Well, I am coming to that, Your Honor. I
will withdraw that question at this time and
ask you to describe generally the damage to
the truck as you remember it~
A. The front wheels of the, the rear wheels of
the tractor was knocked out, the spring hangers on the tractor was broken, the drive shaft
was down, the tractor part. The rear wheels
of the trailer was knocked out, turned so
they weren't tracking. The spring hanger
on the rear trailer was down." (R 333-34)
Officer Clark testified substantially to the same effect
as did Evans and further testified that there were no
other car burns or brake marks above or below the marks
described (R 346-47). As with Evans, the Plaintiff
did not cross examine Clark.
Leo Hales, service manager of Naylor Motor Company in Provo, who was called to remove the vehicles,
also testified that the drive wheels of the truck were
sheared out from the truck, the driveshaft broken, and
the wheels of the semi-trailer sheared off and locked
(R 403) so that neither the tractor nor the trailer could
be moved without a wrecker and another tractor. No
attempt to discredit his description of the physical con-
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dition of the tractor was Inade by counsel for Plaintiff.
It is submitted that tbis undisputed physical evidence establishes that the impact occurred in the Allen
lane of traffic. The gouges running for a distance of
eight feet to the front end of the Mecham car from a
point four feet into the Allen lane conclusively show that
Mecham car must have been four feet into the wrong
lane when the impact knocked the frame of the .car off
its axle (Exhibit "D") and made the gouges as the car
was thrown back. Similarly, the tire burns running to
the left rear end of the trailer( Exhibit "8") show that
the truck was four feet inside its lane when the impact
broke the wheels and set the brakes, causing the burns.
Only recently this Court has recognized the doctrine
that undisputed physical evidence overcomes oral testimony.
Moser vs. Zion Co-operative Mercantile Institute, 197 Pac 2d 136.
And other Courts have applied the principle in cases
where the facts were quite similar to the case at bar.
That principle was stated by the New Hampshire Court
Ill

Lavigne vs. Nelson, Supra.
as follows:
"Although ordinarily it is the province of the
jury to resolve conflicts in oral testimony, here
the Inferences to be drawn from the undisputed
location of the marks on the highway, from the
appearance of the sedan and the truck, and from
the admitted measurements so decisively demonstrate the collision occurred on the East side of
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the road, that all testimony to the contrary must
be rejected. It is a well-established rule that
oral testimony must yield to indisputable physical
facts."
In that case involving a collision between a truck and
an automobile, all the passengers of the automobile testified that their car was on the right side of the road, and
that none saw the truck until just before the collision.
Yet, the physical evidence was that dual tire marks were
on the shoulder of the truck's side of the road, gouge
marks on the truck's side of the center lane and scuff
marks of the car ran from the gouge marks to the position of the car after _the collision. On that basis, the
Court directed a verdict for the Defendant.
The Tenth Circuit, in a case strikingly like this case,
Chambers vs. Skelly Oil Company, 87 Fed. 2d
853,
had the following fact situation before it:
The accident involved a collision between a truck and
a trailer weighing between 17 and 18 tons and being
between 35 and 40 feet in length and an automobile
weighing about 2900 pounds. They were proceeding in
opposite qirections. The driver of the truck testified
that the car approached the place of the accident about
70 miles and hour on hfs side of the road. Just before
the accident, the car turned to the truck's side, swerved
back to the other side and then turned back to the truck's
side of the road and collided with the left front end of
the truck. The truck had been on the South half of the
road traveling at a speed of 32 to 33 miles an hour. When
he observed the car turning toward his side of the road,
22
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he slowed down the truck and turned it off the oiled rna t
toward the ditch on the side of the highway. The driver
of the auton1obile testified that he was driving about
-15 miles an hour. that the truck swerved over into his
side of the highway about three or four feet over the
center line. He thought the truck would get back to his
side ·of the road and turned his car over as far as he
could on his side of the road as possible. A number of
disinterested witnesses, including the investigating officers and highway workers, found the front end of the
truck in the ditch off on the side of the highway and the
coupe in the center of the road, the rear of the truck
headed toward the opposite direction. They were able
to trace the tracks of the truck back for a distance of
fifty feet from the rear end of the truck. The right wheel
tracks were off the mat on the soft shoulder of the road
and the left wheel on the South half of the mat. The
shoulder was soft and the tracks were plain. They indicated the truck had gradually pulled over to the South
edge and off the mat. They also found tracks of the
coupe where it skidded to the South edge of the oiled
mat and back toward the center and up to the point of the
collision. They found broken glass along the side· of the
road scattered over the oiled mat. They also observed
some holes freshly gouged in the oiled mat about halfway between the center line and the South edge of the
mat and opposite the cab of the truck. Photographs
of the coupe taken after the accident, indicated nearly
all the left half of the front of the coupe collided with
the truck. On the basis of this evidence the Tenth Circuit Court said:
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"The rule is likewise settled that when the
testimony of a witness is positively contradicted
by the physical facts, neither the Court nor the
jury can be permitted to credit it (citing cases).
The tracks, scars in the pavement, broken glass
and other physical facts show beyond doubt that
the truck was on the South side of the road and
the coupe swerved or skidded from the side of the
road and collided with the truck on the South side
of the road. That a 2900-pound automobile traveling 45 miles per hour, colliding with a 17-ton truck
would knock the truck from position four feet
North of the center line across and off the pavement on the South side is unreasonable. Had the
collision occurred, as Chambers testified, on the
North side of the oiled mat, it is reasonable to
assume that the light coupe would have been
hurled into the ditch on the North side and not
the heavy truck into the ditch on the South side.
It is undisputed that the coupe remained on the
oiled mat after the collision."
On that basis, the Court concluded that the trial
court did not err in directing the verdict for the truck.
See also
Schultz vs. General Casualty Company, (Wise.)
288 N. W. 803,
to the same effect.
So in the case at bar the brake marks, gouges and
positions of the vehicles establish, without doubt, that
the collision occurred in the Allen lane of traffic. There
can be no dispute that the gouges leading to the Mecham
car were made by it when thrust back by the force of
impact. There can be no doubt that the brake marks
were made by the Truck after the impact locked the
rear wheels. There can be no doubt that a collision be-
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tween a 9 ton truck and an ordinary passenger car in
the south lane of traffic would not throw the heavy truck
to the north side of the road and leave the passenger
car to the north of the point of impact, but would have
exactly the opposite result. There can be no doubt that
the Mecham car was at least 4 feet north of the ·center
line when the collision occurred.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL
MECHAM.
The Court, in its Instruction No. 11, instructed the
jury as follows :
"You are instructed that, until the contrary
is proven, there is a presumption that the ·deceased, Thomas Udell Mecham, was exercising due
and proper care for the protection of his person
and the preservation of his life, at the time of
the accident; this presumption arises from the
instinct of self preservation and the disposition
of man to avoid personal harm. This presumption
is not conclusive, but is a matter to be considered
by the jury in connection with all other facts and
circumstances in the case in determining whether
or not the deceased, Thomas Udell Mecham, was
guilty of contributory negligence at the time of
the accident." (R 55)
The giving of this instruction constituted prejudicial
error in two respects.
In the first place, it does not correctly state the law
as to the presumption of due care on the part of the
deceased. The court's instruction state: "Until the contrary is proven." As this Court only recently has pointed
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out, the presumption of due care on the part of a decedent
merely "places on the opposing party the burden of going
forward with the evidence or of making a prima facie
case on that issue."
Tuttle vs. Pacific Intennountain Express Co.,
________ Utah ____________ , 242 Pac 2d 764.
The instruction, as given by the Court below, required Defendants to prove, apparently by the preponderance of the evidence, that Thomas Udell Mecham was
not exercising due care in ihe operation of the Chevrolet
automobile before the presumption would disappear. In
·the Tuttle case, this Court held that an instruction as to
the existence of the presumption of due care "in the
absence of evidence to the contrary" was confusing where
there was such evidence. Here the requirement of the
instruction is affirmative proof, not merely of presenting
some evidence. As stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe, in the
Tuttle case, as to the required burden of Defendant with
respect to this presumption.
"The 'required burden' as used in the quoted
sentence, I assume, is not that of satifying a particular quantum of proof or of introducing enough
evidence to satisfy the jury that the pr~sumption
or presumptive fact is overcome. The burden is
only that of going forward. If this is kept in
mind, I see nothing wrong with that particular
statement. Then it is for the Court to determine
whether the 'opposing party' has gone forward
by introducing some evidence of how the accident
happened, but if so, it does not need to be sufficient evidence to satisfy the jury or fact finder
that the presumption has been overcome, but only
26
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some evidence as to how the accident happened."
(242 P. 2d 764, 773.)
Secondly, the giving of any instruction with respect
to the presumption was prejuidicial error, as the Defendants more than met their burden of going forward
with evidence. As said by this court in the Tuttle case,
"The -ordinary presumption merely places on
the party claiming the non-existence of the presmnptive fact the burden of producing evidence
from which the fact trier could reasonably find
the non-existence of such fact. In other words,
it plaees on the opposing party the burden of
going forward with the evidence or of making a
prima facie case on that issue. If the opponent
fails to meet this burden the presumptive fact
should be assumed and the jury should be so
instructed if the facts on w:hich the presumption
is based is established, but if the required burden
is satisfied by the opponent the presumption disappears and the facts must be established from
the evidence the same as though no presumption
were
ever involved and it is not proper in such
.
1
case to even mention in the instructions the existence of such presumption. This court has many
times held that such is the effect of presumptions
generally and of this presumption in particular."
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, there was the uncontested physical
evidence, outlined above, that the Mecham car was on
the wrong side of the road. In addition, there· was. the
testimony of Arthur Allen, the driver of the truck, that
the Mecham car, when the two vehicles were about 35
or 40 feet apart, suddenly changed its course around the
curve, came across the line to his side of th~ highway,
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and came at him "headon." (R 365). On that basis, there
was more than a prma facie case that Thomas Udell
Mecham was not exercising due and proper care for the
protection of his person and the preservation of his life,
and on the contrary was creating an almost certain risk
of head-on collision. Under such circumstances, it is not
proper to even mention in the instruction the existence
of such presumption as the Court's Instruction No. 11
delineated.

In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d,
230;
Tuttle vs. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
Supra.
In the Tuttle case, the mention of the presumption
in such circumstances was stated to be not prejudicial
because the court "merely instructed that there was a
presumption in the q,bsence of evidence to the contrary."
But not so in this case. Here the jury were told the presumption existed until the contrary was proven, and the
presumption was to be considered along with all the other
facts and circumstances in the case. Here the jury was
not told the cloak of the presumption was sluffed off and
disappeared with a production of evidence as to how or
why the accident happened, but was instructed that it
was an element to be considered along with the other
facts and circumstances. In other words, the presumption
was evidence. Such is not the law in this State.
Tuttle vs. Pacific I nterm.ountain Express Co.,
Supra;

In re Newell's Estate, Supra;
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Ryan rs. Union Pacific Railway Comp·any, 46
Utah 530, 151 P. 71.
In· the Ryan case, the Utah Court stated the law
with respect to this presumption as follows :

"In the absence of evidence there is a presumption that the deceased used due ·care and,
for his protection, did all that reasonably was
required of him. Had the court charged that and
stopped, the charge would not have been erroneous. When, however, facts and circumstances
are proven to show just what the deceased did, or
failed to do, then his care, or the want of it, is
to be determined, not on the presumption, but
upon the facts and circumstances proven. That
is, whenever the facts or circumstances are shown
concerning which the presmnption is indulged,
the presumption ceases, and the controversy is to
be decided by the weight of the evidence adduced.
That is not what the court charged. As charged,
the jury permitted to cast the presumption on
the scales and to consider and weigh it with the
proven facts and circumstances. There is a presumption of sanity, but when evidence respecting
the sanity or insanity of the person whose mental
condition is the subject of inquiry is adduced,.
the presumption, except as it bears on burden of
proof, is spent and the controversy is to be decided on the weight of the evidence adduced.
There, as here, the presumption calls for evidence;
but when it· is adduced the controversy must. be
decided on the evidence, not on the ·presumption.
Here the court, regardless of what facts were
proven as to the deceased's conduct, in effect
charged that the presumption itself .'was evidence
to be considered in connection with the proven
facts. That was wrong."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

The court's charge here was no "handkerchief over
the blanket," but a whole new suit of clothes furnished
after Defendant's evidence as to how the accident must
have happened, stripped Plaintiff of the presumption's
raiment.
III.

'rHE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.
A. Surprise, or the stange case of Mr. Carter.

It has been observed by courts and commentators
that one purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which our own rules are based, was to
eliminate the element of surprise and concealment from
the trial of law suits.
I Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Section 137.
Surpri~e, which ordinary prudence could not haYr
guarded against, is a ground for new trafunder Rule 59.
It is submitted that Defendants were the unwitting victims of a carefully prepared and executed surprise.
Plaintiff rested late on the afternoon of Friday,
January 25, 1952, after nearly two full days of testimony
(R. 302). Defendants put on one preliminary witness to
,identify the map (Exhibit 8) and certain photographs
(Exhibits 2, 3, 9, 10, 11 and 12) and the Court then
recessed for the week end (R 318). On the following
Monday afternoon, Defendants Allen rested (R 422).
Thereupon, Plaintiff presented as a purported rebuttal
witness one Alfred M. Carter, who testified he was fishing
in Provo Canyon the day of the accident. He stayed at
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the scene only five or six minutes and did not talk to anyone or see anyone he knew (R. 438). By a curious coincidence, he did not see or talk to anyone about the accident
until a year and a half later when on the Saturday night
after the Plaintiff had rested, he was visited by Mr. L. S.
McCullough, one of the attorneys for Plaintiff (R 425-26).
Yet all during the intervening period between the accident and the time of Mr. McCullough's visit, he had
been working in close association with one Simnwns,
father of Plaintiff, in a group of Utah Construction employees at the Geneva Steel Plant (R 81).
Defendant J. H. Allen came into the case in June,
1951, when the insurance company withdrew and the
amended complaint was filed~ His counsel were handicapped by a year's delay in investigation, but used their
utmost diligence and all their discovery rights under the
Rules of Procedure to ascertain all they could about
the case. Interrogatories were served on Plaintiff asking the names of the witnesses (R 11-12). Plaintiff replied with a "weaseling" answer naming some, but expressly excluding those known to her attorneys, her
father-in-law or her brother-in-law. (R 13) Defendants
were then forced to secure· a court order directing Plaintiff to furnish those names she had excluded (R 21). The
supplemental answer (R 22) named Ercanbrack and
White, two of Plaintiff's principal witnesses at the trial
of the action, as the eye witnesses, but did not mention
Carter. Defendant then took the deposition of the fatherin-law, W. 0. Mecham, to learn more about the identity
of the witnesses (R 482). He was asked about each of
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the witnesses named in the answers to the Interrogatories, and on page 67 of his deposition, Line 22, there
appears the following:

"Q.
A.

Who is William

White~

He's a fellow from-I don't know whether
that would be the steel plant, called the steel
plant, or would be on the Springville road.
He works in Provo."

Now William White did live on the Springville road
(R 190), and Mr. Carter did work at the steel plant.
Thus, it is apparent that W. 0. Mecham knew of an eyewitness who worked at the steel plant, and Plaintiff's
father must have known. Any person who had been a
witness to an accident in which a man was killed and
others were seriously injured, would be likely to discuss
the matter with his fellow employees. It is stretching
incredulity that Plaintiff's father, Simmons, did not hear
oi Carter's connection with the accident if, in fact, he
had been there. Yet despite the court's order that the
interrogations be answered "to convey all information
that the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorney have at their
disposal regardless of the source" (R 21) ( empasis supplied), no mention of Carter was made until his dramatic
appearance at the close of the trial.
It is also clear that Defendants used every legal
means to avoid such surprise. They asked the names
of witnesses on Interrogatories. They forced Plaintiff
to make. full disclosure. They had interviewed or taken
the deposition of every witness called by Plaintiff except
the mysterious Carter. What more diligence could have
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been exercised to avoid just what hapepned 1
Surprise coming at the close of the trial makes an
even stronger case for a new trial to remedy the in~
justice done thereby. See
Delmas Fs. ~llartin, 39 Cal 555, quoted with
approval in TVhitfield vs. Debrincat, 18 Cal.
Op 2d 730, 64 Pac. 2d 960 at 962.
That latter case also supports the rule :
"\Vhere a party has used reasonable diligence
to ascertain what his witness will testify to and
has reasonable grounds to believe that the witness
will testify to a certain state of facts and relies
upon his doing so, and he does not do so, and the
case is lost as a consequence, a new trial will be
granted."
It is submitted that a corollary to this rule should be:

"When a party has used reasonable diligence
to ascertain the identity of the witness and what
they will testify to and has reasonable grounds
to believe that there were no other witnesses hiding behind billboards or fishing in streams nearby,
and relies on that state of facts and the case is
lost as a consequence thereof, a new trial will be
granted."

B. Newly Discovered Evidence.
Until Carter testified, there was no credible evidence
placing the car or truck in any other place than the
photographs and the investigating officers placed them.
Carter's testimony, if believed, raised a new issue of
fact. Carter placed the truck and car, when he arrived
on the scene, from the point on the river where he
claimed to have been fishing, on the side of the hill around
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the curve and up· canyon from the location shown in the
photographs and fixed by the investigating officers ( R
426-27).

To support its motion for a new trial, Defendants
submitted affidavits of Louis Washburn, Burt Nichols,
and Keith Taggart, who arrived at the scene at about
the same time or before Carter, as Allen and :Mousley
were still taking out the injured Mechams from the car
at their time of arrival, which both Allen and Mousley
testified, without dispute, was done first. All of these
proposed witnesses would testify that the vehicles immediately after the accident were at the places shown
in the photographs and as testified by the investigating
officers and not as testified by Carter. It is submitted
that their testimony, if believed, would completely discredit the testimony of Carter and would furnish evidence
on a point not in issue in the case in chief. As was said
by this Court in
Jensen vs. Logan Citv. 89 Utah 347, 57 Pac 2d
708 at 723.
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered
testimony on that point appearing from affidavits
in support of the motion for a new trial to be
apparently reliable, when its appears that the
movant for the new trial was not guilty of
indiligence in failing to obtain the witness for
the trial, and that there is no element of holding
such witness in reserve for purpose of obtaining
a new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in slang phraseology as 'an ace in the hole'
-and it appears likely that such evidence would
change the result, a new trial should be- granted.
34
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vVhile the granting or refusing of the motion lies
in the sound discretion of the court, where there
is grave supsicion that justice may have miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on
a vital point which new evidence will ·apparently
supply, and the other elements attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse
of sound discretion not to grant the same.".
Plaintiff sought to answer Defendant's affidavits and
support of its motion of a new trial by affidavits to the
effect that Defendants knew or should have known of
the proposed evidence and the testimony of these witnesses, and because of that fact, Defendants do not meet
the requirement established by this Court in

Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 Pac. 712,and reiterated in Trimble vs. Union Pacific
Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 Pac 2d 674,
that to entitle a defeated party to a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear
that he used reasonable diligence to discover and produce
at the former trial the newly discovered evidence and
that his failure to do so was not the result of his own
negligence. This principle Defendants do not deny. But,
it is submitted, this case is quite a different situation.
The proposed evidence is to shed new light on an is~ue
which was not raised until Carter testified on "rebuttal"
at the close of the trial.. Certainly if Defendants, by
pre-trial discovery, had plucked this ace from Plaintiff's
Counsel's sleeve, they would have been derelict in not
supplying evidence to meet it of which they knew or
.should have known, but from all the Plaintiff's witnesses
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that Defendants were able to discover and interview or
subject to examination by deposition, there was no issue
as to the locale of the accident or the vehicles immediately thereafter. The testimony of Washburn, :Nichols
and Taggart would have been merely cumulative until
Carter's testimony was introduced, but after he testified,
would have tended to make clear a fact as to which ·Carter's testimony may have raised a doubt. See
Jensen vs. Logan City, Supra.
It is submitted that the trial court, when acquainted
with the surprise nature of Carter's testimony, the diligence of Defendants and their Counsel to avoid that
hazard, and the availability of evidence which would discredit that new issue belatedly raised by Plaintiffs and
which would conteract the psychological advantage with
the jury which Plaintiff's tactics gained, should have,
particularly in view of the physical evidence produced,
granted a new trial. Only by a new trial can the effect
on the jury of the last-minute surprise presentation of
Carter be eliminated.
SUMMARY AND CONCLU'SION
Defendants submit that the undisputed physical evidence clearly places the collision in the Allen lane of
traffic; and that therefore, the conclusion is inescapable
that Thomas Udell Mecham was negligent as a matter
of law in being on the wrong side of the road. Furthermore, there was no creditable evidence that Arthur R.
Allen was negligent in any respect. On the basis of the
evidence before it, the trial court should not have submitted to the jury the issue of Defendants' negligence and
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liability, but should have directed a verdict of no cause
of action.
But the trial court compounded that error by instructing the jury that Thomas Mecham was presumed
to be a prudent and careful driver and that the jury was
to consider that presumption along with the evidence in
the case. Just how much weight the jury gave this imponderable shadow is not known, but suffice it to say,
that they were instructed to weigh it is prejudicial error.
Finally Defendants, already the victims of a misunderstanding over insurance coverage and the withdrawal from the defense by the insurance company in
midstream, became the victims of a surprise· witness
whose identity and existence was carefully hidden until
the denouement in the closing moments of the trial created the psychological effect on the jury that strategy
had envisioned.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is. submitted that
Defendants are entitled to a reversal of the judgment
of the Court below.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT
AND MABEY,
PETER W. BILLINGS,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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